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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
15560

-vsARVIL A. HARRIS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant pled guilty to the charge of attempting
to receive stolen property, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.

§

76-6 408 (as amended 1973).

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was arraigned before the Third District
Court in and for Salt Lake County and entered a plea of
guilty to the reduced charge of attempting to receive
stolen property.

He requested a pre-sentence investigation.

Subsequently the court received and reviewed the pre-sentence
report and appellant came before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor
for sentencing, whereupon appellant was ordered to pay a
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$1,000.00 fine and sentenced to a one-year term in the Salt
Lake County Jail.
Appellant thereafter duly filed a motion seeking
an order allowing him to withdraw his plea of guilty and
enter a not guilty plea; asking that the judgment be arrested,
the sentence suspended, and the defendant be discharged;
requesting a new trial, and seeking to examine and review
the pre-sentence report and to have an opportunity to explain
or rebut the derogatory allegations which he believed were
contained therein.

All motions were denied by the court.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this court which
refuses to allow appellant to withdraw his guilty plea
and which affirms the judgment and sentence of the trial
court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant was originally charged with receiving
stolen property, a third degree felony

(R.6)

After the com-

plaint was amended to charge attempting to receive stolen
property, appellant waived preliminary hearing in the Salt
Lake City Court and was bound over to the District Court
for trial.

To the charge contained in the information (R.8,9),

appellant pled guilty and asked for a pre-sentence investigation and report (R.48-52).

Approximately four weeks later,
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he appeared before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor for sentencing, where he was ordered to pay a $1,000.00 fine and serve
a one-year term in the court jail.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ONCE THE TRIAL COURT HAD ACCEPTED A VALID GUILTY
PLEA, THE DECISION TO VACATE THE PLEA LAY WITHIN THE SOUND
DISCRETION OF THE COURT.
Before accepting appellant's guilty plea to the
charge of attempted theft by receiving stolen property,
the trial court explained to appellant that his constitutional rights would be affected, that some rights, such as
a trial by jury, would be waived (R.49).

The court included

the following statement, pertinent in the case at bar:
"You can't be forced to incriminate
yourself in any manner, but by entering
a plea of guilty you do incriminate
yourself, and you admit the facts that
~rt the crime charged."
(R.49)
(Emphasis added)
Then, in order to meet the requirements of Boykin
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238

(1969), that a guilty plea be knowingly

and intelligently given, and Strong v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 294,
452 P.2d 323

(1969), that the plea be made voluntarily, with-

out undue influence or coercion, the court interrogated
appellant.
"THE COURT:
To the charge in the
Information what is your plea, guilty
or not guilty?
-3-_
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MR. HARRIS:

Guilty.

THE COURT:
Before the Court accepts
that plea I'll ask you some questions.
Were you present in the courtroom when I
gave advice on constitutional rights?
MR. HARRIS:

Yes, I was.

THE COURT:

You understand those?

MR. HARRIS:

Yes, I do.

THE COURT:
Are you freely and
voluntarily entering a plea at this time?
MR. HARRIS:

Yes, I am.

THE COURT:
Has any promises been
made to you to induce this plea?
MR. HARRIS:

No.

THE COURT:
Has any threats or
coercion been made against you to induce
this plea?
MR. HARRIS:

No.

THE COURT:
Are you presently under
the influence of any drugs, narcotics, or
alcoholic beverages?
MR. HARRIS:

No, I'm not.

THE COURT:
A plea of guilty is received
by the Court. The Court finds that the
Defendant freely and voluntarily entered the
plea, that he's not presently under the influence of any drugs, narcotics, or alcoholic
beverages, and I base those findings on my
observations of the Defendant in the courtroom
together with the questions that were asked
of him and his responses thereto." (R.50-51)

-4-
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Appellant now seeks release from the guilty plea
and complains that the court did not make a determination
that there were facts sufficient to warrant a finding of
guilty before accepting his plea.

Respondent asserts that

the trial court fulfilled its duty under the law.

It had

before it the affidavit of the Chief Criminal Deputy County
Attorney for Salt Lake County wherein William Hyde alleged
that "the evidence in the case supports the charge made
against the defendant named."

(R.9).

It had before it the

appellant's plea of guilty, given after the admonishment to
him that such a plea was an admission that the facts charged
were true.

Finally, it had before it the record of the case,

which revealed that appellant was pleading to a reduced
charge, the result of a negotiated plea.

These factors

provided a sufficient basis for the trial court's satisfaction
that facts warranting a finding of guilty existed.

Therefore,

acceptance of the plea was proper and valid under State v.
Forsythe, 560 P.2d 337

(Utah 1977), which allows flexibility

in plea-taking procedures:
"We recognize, of course, that it
is the duty of the trial court to see
that the interests of justice are
served by not allowing a person to
enter a plea of guilty to a crime he
has not committed.
In performing
that duty, the court is not bound to
any rigidity of rule or procedure,
but may do it in any manner consistent
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with reason and fairness which he
thinks will best accomplish that ·
urpose."
560 P.2d at 339 (Emphasis
added
Finally, counsel for appellant states that even
at the time of sentencing the court made no inquiry into
the facts of the crime or of appellant's culpability.
However, before sentencing, defense counsel stated in his
plea for leniency:
"He [the appellant) has received
the property involved in this case,
and we admitted to that.
I think
there may be some indication on
another occasion or two before that
he received some property."
(R.43)
Appellant now insinuates that he had a defense
of entrapment.

He could have raised that issue when he

entered his plea or at sentencing.

He did not.

What he

did say at sentencing is recorded at T.44:
"This is the first time that I
have been a fence.
Now if we can
reconsider in this condition: This
man--it was a stool pigeon."
This court has consistently held that a motion
to withdraw a guilty plea is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.

State v. Lee Lim, 79 Utah 68,

7 P.2d 825 (1932); State v. Larson, 560 P.2d 335 (Utah 1977).
As appellant has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating
abuse of tnat discretion, respondent urges rejection of his
claim.
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1).

POINT II
CURRENT LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE THE DISCLOSURE OF
A CONFIDENTIAL PRE-SENTENCE REPORT WHERE THE COURT DOES NOT
EXPLICITLY RELY UPON THE INFORMATION CONTAINED THEREIN.
Neither federal nor state law requires the disclosure of a pre-sentence report.
480 F.2d 928

United States v. Gardner,

(10th Cir. 1973), cert. den. 414 U.S. 977, 38

L.Ed.2d 220 states that Rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure places the disclosure of pre-sentence
reports within the discretion of the trial court and that
denial of a defendant's request to inspect is not a due
process violation.

In Utah the disclosure issue has arisen

on several occasions, and in each instance this court has
found disclosure of the pre-sentence investigation report
lying within the sound discretion of the trial court.

Reddish

v. Smith, 576 P.2d 859 (Utah 1978); State v. Doremus, 29 Utah
2d 373, 510 P.2d 529

(1973).

"In order that there be no doubt
as to what we believe the proper
rule, it is the opinion of this court
that it be left to the sound discretion of the trial court to determine
whether or not the contents of the
pre-sentence investigation report
should be furnished to the defendant
in its entirety or such portions
thereof as the court might deem
appropriate."
510 P.2d at 529

-7-
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The United States Supreme Court recently considered this issue in Gardner v. Florida, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51
L.Ed.2d 393 (1977).

Although relied upon by appellant,

respondent asserts that Gardner is not dispositive, but distinguished on its facts.

Gardner had been convicted of

first degree murder, with the jury recommending a life
sentence.

Thereafter the trial judge disregarded the jury's

advisory opinion and sentenced the defendant to death, relying in part on a pre-sentence investigation report, a confidential portion of which was neither disclosed to nor
requested by the defendant or his counsel.

On appeal, the

state supreme court affirmed the conviction and sentence,
stating that the record had been carefully reviewed,
although the confidential report had not been included in
the record.
The United .states Supreme Court vacated the death
sentence, and while not agreeing on an opinion, six members
of the court agreed that imposition of the death penalty
in that case were invalid.
Mr. Justice Stevens, speaking for three members
of the Court, held that petitioner's due process was denied
when the death sentence was imposed, at least in part, on
the basis of information that he had no opportunity to deny
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or explain.

Because the death penalty is now recognized

as a punishment different in kind from any other (see §regg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 49 L.Ed.2d 859

(1976)), the

capital sentencing procedure, as well as the trial, must
satisfy due process.

While the Court did not find any

rationale in the Gardner case for withholding the report,
the Court concluded that even if good cause for nondisclosure did exist, it is constitutionally impermissible to
exclude the confidential report from the record on appeal
as the reviewing court would be unable to determine if the
death penalty was being imposed evenhandedly.
The instant case is not a capital case; it is a
class A misdemeanor.

Appellant faced a maximum one-year

jail sentence, not extinction of his person.

The Gardner

requirements of full disclosure are inapplicable to the sentencing procedures of a non-capital case, and sound discretion
of the court is still the standard.
The record contained no request by appellant for
inspection of the pre-sentence report prior to sentencing.
At sentencing the trial judge gave no indication whatsoever
that he was relying upon the contents of the report and
made no references to it.

(Defense counsel concedes he

has no knowledge that the report contained any inaccuracies
or derogatory statements about appellant.)

After listening
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to a plea for leniency by defense counsel in accordance with
Utah Code Ann.

§

77-35-12

(1953 as amended) 1 , Judge Jaylor

imposed the one-year sentence adding:
"The operation of fencing in
this community gives the common
criminal an accessible source for
the distribution of stolen goods
and their effects.
I would venture
to say 95 percent of the burglaries
that occur in this community are
drug related, and the same spokes
on the wheel keep coming by.
The burglar burglarizing in
order to sell property in order to
buy drugs.
I think this has got
to stop.
I am going to deny probation and coruuitt you forthwith
to the Salt Lake County Jail.
That will be the order of the court."
(R.44)
Clearly, the court imposed the maximum sentence
because the "fences" in this community enable the burglars,
who often need money for narcotics, to market their stolen
goods and to that extent, provides a medium in which thieves
can thrive.

Respondent submits that the crime of receiving

stolen property--or attempting to receive it--is not, as

1

77-35-12. Discretion of court--Exercise.--When
is conferred upon the court as to the extent of
the court, at the time of pronouncing judgment,
into consideration any circumstances, either in
tion or mitigation of the punishment, which may
presented to it by either party.
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discretion
punishment,
may take
aggravathen be

appellant suggests, an ordinary crime against property;
therefore, appellant's reliance
for leniency was misplaced.

on his first-offender status

The professional fence, by his

accessibility and his actual involvement, encourages thieves
to steal and is thereby a vital link in this chain of crime.
The court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, chose
to remove the link and weaken the chain.
Uta~

Code Ann. § 77-35-12 (1953 as amended and Utah

Code Ann. § 77-62-30 2 are not mutually exclusive.

In corn-

plementing each other the former allows either party to
present evidence specifically in aggravation or in mitigation
of the punishment.

The latter authorizes the court to

request a pre-sentence investigation report from a neutral
source, the division of corrections, with the resulting
investigation likely to uncover both aggravating
igating factors.

and mit-

This unbiased report, with its recommenda-

tions, can then be used with the arguments of the interested

2

77-62-30. clinics and exarninations.--The division of
corrections shall establish and maintain clinics for the
purpose of thoroughly investigating the social, rnenta~ and
physical conditions and background of tho~e c~arged with
the various crimes and shall conduct examinations wherever
required, and, upon completing.such.an.examination, the
division shall file a copy of its findings and formal
clinical report with the court having.jurisdictio~ and make
such recommendations to the court as it may see fi~. For
this purpose the division may, ~ithout expense to it, command the services of an expert in the employ of the state
of Utah or any other expert in the employ of any state
institution.
-11-
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parties and in a filtering and meshing process, determine
the most appropriate sentence.

Of course, a defendant may

waive the pre-sentence report and be sentenced immediately.
Respondent submits that these statutes can work
in harmony and that disclosure of the confidential report to
the defendant is unnecessary unless the trial judge states
that he has relied on specific information contained therein,
which revelation may force disclosure.

However, that

situation is not before the court.
CONCLUSION
Because the trial court validly accepted a guilty
plea and did not abuse its discretion in sentencing or in
refusing to vacate the plea, respondent urges the court to
affirm the judgment and sentence.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSON
Attorney General
MICHAEL L. DEAMER
Deputy Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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